

# Trusted services in Luxembourg

1st Luxembourgish Workshop on  
Location-based Services and Privacy Assurance  
(LSPA)

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## Agenda

- Context and Privacy threats
- User requirements
- Location Assurance Service Provider
- Security Approaches
  - EuroPriSe
  - Product Security
- Outlook

## Objectives

- Foster discussion on security issues of Location-Based Service (LBS)
- Explain privacy issues in our projects, e.g. LASP

## > Growing Location-Based Service




Many free services

Geo-tagging

- on each iPhone, e.g.
- on Picture sites on the web

New services very easy to make

- built on free service Google Map and GeoAPI
- cf [itrust-foetz.servehttp.com/Alidade](http://itrust-foetz.servehttp.com/Alidade)



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# Context

## > Growing Location-Based Service

### New service very easy to make

- built on free service Google Map and GeoAPI
- takes less than a week
- cf [itrust-foetz.servehttp.com/Alidade](http://itrust-foetz.servehttp.com/Alidade)

Orange F 3G 20:33

ALIDADE

[itrust-foetz.servehttp.c...](http://itrust-foetz.servehttp.c...) Google

Switch to map

Locate me! Default map!

Latitude:	43.6589379	o
Longitude:	7.19753986	o
Accuracy:	500	m
Altitude:		m
My id:	Cha	

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
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> Little, but growing privacy awareness

## No real care on passwords and shared information

- Social engineering for password very easy
- Very private info are shared with the entire world,
- cf [www.cases.lu](http://www.cases.lu)

## Concerns by data privacy authorities

- Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking (01189/09/EN WP 163):
  - No search on location without explicit consent,
  - access to near members is criticised.
- Cf [www.cnpd.lu](http://www.cnpd.lu), [ec.europa.eu](http://ec.europa.eu)



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
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# Context

> ... resulting in lots of information



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Is the user ready to pay for better privacy and security ?

How to build this security ?

How to get users trust in this security ?

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## Client-based

- The user computes his position.
- e.g. GPS
- easier to secure than...

## Network-based

- Ex: iPhone: a service provider Skyhook tells you the location of the WiFi antenna next to you
- This provider has the possibility to trace users, abuse or sell data...
  
- Should we trust such service providers ?
- Do we have a choice ?
- Better: When can we trust?

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# User requirements

## > Demo at Galileo Application Days (1/2)



### Based on demo and questionnaires

On March 2010, in Bruxelles  
Not representative,  
feedback from 32 questionnaires:

### Functionalities

People want to have a

- fast and easy to handle service
- with high accuracy (~1 meter (38%), ~10 meters (44%)),
- which could be installed on the most popular mobile phones.

### Price

OK for commercial service (73%),  
with cost between 3 and 5 Euro per month (34%).

### Target use is the family environment

for localisation of their young children (40%) and of their elder family members (21%)

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# User requirements

## > Demo at Galileo Application Days (2/2)



### Main obstacle

- concern that data could be shared with other parties (39%),
- concern that they can get localised without their consent (31%)

### Requirements

- data to be stored securely
  - operator be put under supervision of a Data Protection Authority (66%),
- > people have large concerns on their privacy.

### Interpretation

- in contradiction with the current popularity of unsecured social networks, and the willingness of peoples to share very private information.
- But it is consistent with the current public debates and the raised concerns on privacy issues.

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### Increased awareness for privacy

- Thanks to Facebook, Google StreetView
- Confirmed at the CNPD Conference:



### Business Case

- In EU, 90 Million GPS handsets by 2012.
- LBS enable smartphone low penetration in EU compared to the world.
- ABI Research: market for wireless location-based applications is expected to reach \$14.5 Billion in 2014.
- Local advertising market is estimated to be \$150 Billion in the U.S. alone”  
<http://www.indoorlbs.com/search/label/indoor%20location>

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## Location Assurance Service Provider

ESA Project by itrust consulting and University of Luxembourg  
2010-2012

## Objectives

Specify and implement a prototype of a localisation authority

- Performing security checks before certifying a localisation
- Demonstrate service and communication between LAP and devices to assess the user location

Consider privacy issues (like anonymity) for privacy-enhanced services

Deploy and disseminate the service

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
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### Product Security:

ISO 15408 Common criteria

### Process Security:

ISO/IEC PRF TR 19791

### Information Security Management System:

ISO/IEC 27001 ISMS – Requirements

ISO/IEC 27002 ISMS – Code of Practice...

ISO/IEC 27006 ISMS – ...Certification

### Privacy standards:

ISO 29100 Privacy Framework, ...

ISO 29190 Privacy capability assessment framework, ...

### Labels

Selon les réflexes CASES

EuroPriSe (European Privacy Seal)

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### Definition

EuroPriSe (European Privacy Seal)

### What is it?

Transparent European privacy certificate that fosters

- consumer protection & civil rights;
- trust in IT;
- privacy by marketing mechanisms.

### Source:

[www.european-privacy-seal.eu](http://www.european-privacy-seal.eu)

### Owner:

Unabhängige Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein

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
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## What is ISO 15408?

### CC = Common Criteria

= an internationally standardised collection of criteria for the evaluation of security related products

<http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/>

### CC (ISO 15408) consists of three parts:

1. Introduction
2. Security Functional Requirements
3. Security Assurance Requirements  
(CEM = CC Evaluation Methodology  
= instructions for the evaluator how to verify the developer's compliance with the criteria)

### Usage here

- Part 2 to design and document secure LBS in full transparency
- Later: certify that it is secure in the conditions that it has been designed for.

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
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## Protection Profile

= security profile for a product called Target Of Evaluation



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### TOE type:

- Software software component for different devices such as Smartphone.
- Read location information of GPS chipset
- Send it regularly to a web server.
- Retrieve location of others from web server.

### Usage:

- collect and send location data about people

### Security objectives for operational environment

- The correct operation of the TOE depends on
  - the operating system on which it is installed,
  - on the hardware,
  - on the visibility of satellite signals, and
  - on the GSM network for external communication.

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### Assets:

D\_Data: Location data which are transferred through the application from the GPS chipset to the web server.

D\_Data\_Conf: Configuration data of the application.

D\_Application: The application which is installed on the smartphone.

### Threats:

T\_Confidentiality: Access to the location data by an unauthorized person or program by listening to the message or by accessing to configuration data through a second application. On data and config

T\_Integrity: Modification of the application configuration. The application can be modified to send location data to a wrong server or to send wrong location data.

On data and config, not applic. as OS not under control

No availability as very hard to handle formally !

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### Security objectives of the TOE :

OT\_Confidentiality: The location data has to be protected against access from unauthorized person.

OT\_Software\_Integrity: The application should not be modified by a malware or an unauthorized person.

OT\_Data\_Integrity: The data send by the software should not be manipulated before reception by the web server and vice versa.

OT\_Configuration\_Integrity: The password should not be modified by an unauthorized person.

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
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# Process Security

## Overview ISO TR 19791 (Draft!)



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### Findings:

It is easy to develop (unsecure) LBS.

Users want security and require supervision of Service provider

We recommend transparent security design and commitment to a protection profile.

We defined a high-level model for general LBS security.

Service provider should be prepared for certification or at least labelisation.

### Challenges:

Do security that the user is willing to pay.

No control on global player (Google, Skyhook),

But they have a reputation to defend !

No control on OS (iPhone, e.g.)

-> considerable limit on the final privacy that a local service provider can ensure.

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**Thank you for your  
attention**

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## > Activities

### (1) Management consulting



#### Risk Analysis:

- Value model
- Safeguard evaluation
- Risk map
- Risk status
- Deficiencies report



Computer Forensics



#### Classification

SE	VIT	7
CO		6
RE	IMP	5
IN		4
PU	NOR	3
		2
		1



PHISHING?



Crypto

Protocoles

### (3) Technical (and security) design

### (4) Training and awareness

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### Consultancy

- ESA Studies LuxLAUNCH
- Security policies
- Information risk analysis

### Audit

- Web Banking
- Proces certification
- Malware analysis
- ISO 27001,
- ISO 15408...

### R&D – Technical and security design

- ESA: Secure Galileo localisation
- Incident manager
- Celtic, FP-7
- Risk Management Tool TRICK-Light

### Multisourcing

- Security officer assistance
- SME security support (in preparation)

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### Research in the strategy of itrust consulting

#### Acronym for

“Information : Techniques and  
Research for Ubiquitous Security and Trust”

#### Strategy:

from pure consulting to  
mix between security design, support,  
and consulting.

#### Past experience:

Essential support to sustainable growth in 2009:  
6 employee with permanent contracts

#### Tactic:

Maintain high rate of R&D  
in the next 3 years

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#### Turnover 2010

